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Military Genius - Hannibal

The following is a summary i did on an essay i found on the internet. I wish i had more time to follow my passion. originall essay can be found at www.roman-empire.net

The newly elected Roman Consuls, Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who had both run on a platform of taking the war to Hannibal, were anxious to begin their tenure with military achievement. Hannibal meanwhile, still attempting to subvert Roman authority in the allied areas of Italy, was waiting for the Roman with approximately 40,000 men; Gauls, Carthaginians and Numidian cavalry. Hannibal, despite his numerical inferiority had such an overwhelming strategic edge, that he was eager to meet the new Roman challenge. Theoretically, the Roman tactic of crushing Hannibal between two large armies should have spelled his doom, but Hannibal's brilliance allowed him to turn the tables once the engagement got under way.

The Consul Varro was in command on the first day for the Romans, as the consuls alternated commands as they marched. Hasdrubal, commanding the Numidians, quickly overpowered the inferior Romans on the right flank and routed them. As Hasdrubal was routing the Roman horse, the mass of infantry on both sides advanced towards each other in the middle of the field. The Iberian and Gallic Celts on the Carthaginian side, while fierce, were no match for Roman armament and close-quartered combat. The Romans soon found that their success in the middle was pushing them into a potential disaster. Just as the Romans were on the brink of crushing the enemy center, the Carthaginian flanks were brought to bear and the pressure pinned in the Roman advance. Hasdrubals' cavalry completed the circle by forcing the rear of the Roman line to turn back and form a square. All around, the massive bulk of the Roman army was forced into confined space. Unable to continue the original break through against the Celts in the center of Hannibal's lines, the Romans were easy prey for the Carthaginians. Hannibal, with complete fury, encouraged his own men, under fear of the lash, if they weren't zealous enough in the slaughter.

Hannibal, however, still trying to win the hearts of the Italian Roman allies, once again released the prisoners, much to the dismay of his commanders. In salute to the fallen Paullus, Hannibal also honored him with ceremonial rituals in recognition of his valiant actions.

In the end, perhaps only as many as 15,000 Romans managed to escape with Varro. There was nothing keeping Hannibal from sacking Rome itself at this point, other than Hannibal. Still believing he couldn't take Rome itself, he preferred his strategy of pursuing revolt among the Roman allies.

Shortly after Cannae, the Romans rallied back, declaring full mobilization. As the land owning population was heavily diminished by losses to Hannibal, the Romans took advantage of the masses. In so doing, the Romans also refused to pay ransoms to Hannibal for any captured legionaries who still remained. While fortune would still be with Hannibal for some time, the war of attrition would only benefit Rome

ONCE AGAIN! my hobby!

Since I am sick(once again), I decided to post another entry at my blog (zanatos.typepad.com). Unfortunately tonight I am blocked at my home since outside there is another Political party having its main event. This time the PM will give a speech. That means more people turning out and more money spent on the organization
So since I am “isolated” I have time to write about my favorite subject, military history. Business history is something akin to military history, the main difference is that business history has started to be documented the last century and it is a new genre. A genre however that has offered and is offering lots of lessons. Professors, executives and other parties document what has happened what went wrong(most of the times), about successes and “Leaders”. All of this has evolved from Military history practices.
Nowadays executives and managers are supposed to know the past so they can avoid the past mistakes, repeat previous successes and improvise new techniques. It is considered normal practice for ambitions men to be uptodate with all the new management techniques and theories. In the past generals and officers needed to know what had happened in previous battles, what were the results, how the armies were set up and of course the tactics used during the actual battles. Successful generals’ mondus operandi were systematically studied and considered a mantra. Alexander and Hannibal were considered a “must read”
Military history like every other aspect has contributed to progress mostly by learning how to “avoid” past mistakes. This genre was one of the first to be developed since the ancient world was full of wars(unfortunately) and most kings/ rulers wanted to put down in memory what had happened during their reign, how they helped their subjects (basically themselves) by growing their kingdom’s borders. Military history is composed of the events in the history of humanity that fall within the category of conflict. This may range from a melee between two tribes to conflicts between proper militaries to a world war affecting the majority of the human population. Military historians record (in writing or otherwise) the events of military history.
According to wikipedia there are 6 periods: Prehistoric, Ancient, Medieval, Gunpowder, Industrial and Modern. There is a different amount of information depending on the period. My personal favorite is the Ancient one due to Alexander’s achievements and Hannibal’s military genius displayed against the great Roman Empire. Prehistoric warfare is war conducted in the era before writing, and before the establishments of large social entities like states. Historical warfare sets in with the standing armies of Bronze Age Sumer, but prehistoric warfare may be studied in some societies at much later dates. Medieval warfare is the warfare of the Middle Ages. In Europe, technological, cultural, and social developments had forced a dramatic transformation in the character of warfare from antiquity, changing military tactics and the role of cavalry and artillery. Similar patterns of warfare existed in other parts of the world. In China, weapons employing the use of gunpowder date back to the 10th century, and the first permanent standing Chinese navy was established in the early 12th century by the Song Dynasty.
Gunpowder warfare is associated with the start of the widespread use of gunpowder and the development of suitable weapons to use the explosive. It was first invented in China and then later spread to the Middle East, it then found its way into eastern Europe and modern day Israel, following the invasions of the Mongols who had employed Chinese gunpowder based weapons to conquer parts of Europe and the Middle East then into central and western Europe following the crusades when European forces discovered the substance from the Islamic forces they faced. This was prior to the 15th century on a limited basis, but became dominant in the Early Modern Age and lasted until the mid-19th century, with its apex during the Napoleonic Wars from 1792 to 1815. An early advocate was English philosopher and cleric Roger Bacon.
Industrial warfare is a period in the history of warfare ranging roughly from the start of the Industrial Revolution to the beginning of the Information Age, which saw the rise of nation-states, capable of creating and equipping large armies and navies through the process of industrialization. It featured mass-conscripted armies, rapid transportation (first on railroads, then by sea and air), telegraph and wireless communications, and the concept of total war. In terms of technology, this era saw the rise of rifled breech-loading infantry weapons capable of massive amounts of fire, high-velocity breech-loading artillery, metal warships, submarines, aircraft, rockets and missiles, armoured warfare, and nuclear weapons.
Modern warfare involves the widespread use of highly advanced technology. As a term, it is normally taken as referring to conflicts involving one or more first world powers, within the modern electronic era. However, this is not to say that third world countries do not also engage in war, although they are more prone to the use of low-tech weaponry and guerilla tactics.

Battle of Leuctra!

Historical Significance The battle is of great significance in Greek history, and, by extension, world history. Epaminondas not only broke away from the traditional tactical methods of his time, but marked a revolution in military tactics, affording the first known instance of an oblique infantry deployment and one of the first deliberate concentrations of attack upon the vital point of the enemy's line. The new tactics of the phalanx, introduced by Epaminondas, employed for the first time in the history of war the modern principle of local superiority of force. The use of these tactics by Epaminondas was, perhaps, a direct result of the use of some similar maneuvers by Pagondas, his countryman, during the Battle of Delium. Further, Philip of Macedon, who studied and lived in Thebes, was no doubt heavily influenced by the battle to develop his own, highly effective approach to tactics and armament. In turn, his son Alexander would go on to develop his father's theories to an entirely new level. Historians Victor Davis Hanson and Donald Kagan, among others, have argued that Epaminondas's so-called "oblique formation" was not an intentional and preconceived innovation in infantry tactics, but was rather a clever response to circumstances. Because Epaminondas had stacked his right side to a depth of fifty shields, the rest of his units were naturally left with far fewer troops than normal. This means that their maintenance of a depth of eight to twelve shields had to come at the expense of either number of companies or their width. Because Epaminondas was already outnumbered, he had no choice but to form fewer companies and march them diagonally toward the much longer Spartan line in order to engage as much of it as possible. Hanson and Kagan's argument is therefore that the tactic was more dilatory than anything else. Whatever its motivation, the fact remains that the tactic did represent an innovation and was undoubtedly highly effective. The battle's political effects were far-reaching: The losses in material strength and prestige (prestige being an inestimably important factor in the Peloponnesian War) sustained by the Spartans at Leuctra and subsequently at the Battle of Mantinea were key in depriving them forever of their supremacy in Greece. Therefore, the battle permanently altered the Greek balance of power, as Sparta was deprived of her former prominence and was reduced to a second-rate power among the Greek city states.

The concept of RMA: Revolutions in Military Affairs

I decided that since now this blog has a lot of readers: 25 standard reader per day, I will trie and impart them with my knowledge of Miltary history. I will post infreqeuntly short articles, discussions about some aspects of war. It will come no suprise to you, my readers if my first subject is the ART OF WAR by ALexander THE GREAT. Everybody knows who Alexander is, if not go here. Before i start i should ask... Did The Greek Kingdom of Macedonia revolutionize the art of warfare, or were these develpments merely the maturation of an evolutionary process?

Military expers  use a tool to help answer this question. I have read about the RMAs, Revolutions in Military Affairs. To make my point clear, an RMA occurs when certain developments in war are implemented in such a way that massive military advantage is gained over those who don't. Using this framework I will try to give an answer how revolutionary Alexander's style of warfare was. By understanding the aforesiad, the reader can get a better idea why Alexander was so utterly marvelous on the battlefield.

SInce it is Chinese new year I will refer to the four more obivous RMAs: Gunpowder, Napoleonic, Airpower and nuclear war. So how can the reader realize what an RMA is? Technological, socio-political changes guide the development of an RMA. Certain advances in the art of Warfare can only be pursued in the aftermath of significant changes in the political enirnment.  However this is not enough. New tactical and operational concepts are required. In turn, for these concepts to be exploited an army must be reorganised into new organisational structures.

A classic example of an RMA is BLITZKRIEG. The internal combustion engine made possible the development of the tank and its supporting logistics and infantry behicles. The advent of the radio was a soliton to the problem of rapid manoeuvers in the theatre of opeartions.  Thiese two developments produced forces tha moved rapidly in a coordinated manner.

WIthout a doctrine, is not enough. To get the most out of this combination a doctrine is required. The French didn't have it. The Germans have it. More about the Blitzkrieg in another post.

Military History: Are the Nuclear weapons the solution to eternal peace?

Since the end of World War II  there has been no return to full-scale conflict between major, powers, but nor has there been a single day without a war going on somewhere around the globe. Weapons systems of great destructive power and technological sophistication have been developed, a whole category of which- nuclear weapons- has not been used since 1945.

The War that never escalated into War: The Cold war

From the late 1940s to the late 1980s, the two superpowers-= the united States and the Soviet Union (the USSR)- continuously  prepared for a Third World War that never happened. From the 1950s they engaged in a nuclear arms race that led within a decade to the era of "mutually assured destruction" (MAD), a strategic deadlock in wich nuclear war was prevented by the certainty that both sides would suffer an unacceptable level of damage if one broke out. When Einstein was asked how would the Third WOrld war be fought he replied "I do not how the Third is going to be waged, but the fourth will be waged with stones and clubs". While the balance of fear prevented a wordl war, an American- led struggle against the spread of communism was instead fought out in a series of local wars. Whereas in the first half of the 20th centruy "total war" had seemed to develop almost naturally, with combatants using as much destructive power as they could muster, the korean War of 1950-54 in contrast set the pattern for "limited war": limited in scope, with US soldiers fighting Chinese troops in Korea but no American attacks on CHina itself, and limited in weaponry, since the Inited States did not use the atom bobms it possessed. many of the wars fought in the nuclear age- for example in Vietnam- were, even so, massively destructive, partly becaseu the limits on the conduct of war made it difficult to achieve a swift, decisive result.

As a Military historian artillery and ballistic missiles made the war a full sclae conflict where the lossess would mount on every side. the noble days of Alexander and Hannibal were long forgotten.

Karl Von Clausewitz, a name you should remember

  Who is this guy? You should know him or at least his book: On war. Some people mistkae military strategy with businnes strategy and consider Clausewitz a bussiness strategist. I disaggree but more of that in my UPCOMING THESIS. here are some information about Mr. Karl. He was an Prussian army office and was present at may major battles of the Napoleonic wars, including Jena and Waterloo. From 1818 he became superintendent of the Berlin War College, a postion that enabled him to develop his historical and theoretical views on Warfare. What i completely aggree with him on principle was that war ideally consituted "the continuation of politics by other means", a preactical instrument for achieving political goals, which should be limited in its means and its ends. Yet , in his dense and subtle arguments, he also recognized the irrational violence of war and the large measure of chaos and chance involved in armed conflict. To all my readers you should read his books. It will broaden your horizons. ALthough i have to say i prefer Zhuge Liang's book on strategy.

Midlle 19th Century. Nationalism and Modernization

It is sunday night and i feel the need to write an article about the 19th century. The 19th century show  so many changes regarding war, strategy and nation building. From 1815 to 1914 Europe was free of the near constant warfare between major power that had characterized the preceding centuries. Apart from some sharp but shot outbreaks between 1848 and 1871, associated with the creation of new nation state in Germany and Italy, armed conflicts were concetntrated in Marginal areas in or around the Ottoman empire, who was the sick man of europe. But peace never brings around the demilitarization of the European Powers.

Nationalism. As well as fighting colonial wars(more of this another day), European states armed and trained to fight each other until the beginning of the GREAT WAR. Britain was saved by its navy and able to depend on a small professional army. Other countries had to depend on the military service, a standard part of life for every European male(sitll true in some coutnries like Greece). As Europe's population grew from around 200 million in 1815 to almost 500 million in 1914, conscription created armed forces of unprecedented size. Improve railways( The prussians to make perfect use of them) allowed these large armies to be moved swiftly to a battlefield, while modernized state bureaucracies organized their equipment and supplies. By the late century, most European countries were roused by a militant flag waving patriotism encouraged by popular newpspapers and propaganda. The military was a source of national pride. Military excercises became prominent annual events attended by monarch and political leaders.

Modernization: What i like about the Era before the Great war was how the way to wage battle changed so rapidly. The Prussians set the pace for military modernization with the development of a highly professional general staff(Moltke the great IMO) responsible for planning and execution of large-scale warfare. All European armies were forced to follow their unprecednted example. Far from being reactionary(As they are today), most European military leaders sought new technologies and weapons that would give them the edge in battle. The use of airships and winged aircraft in the early 20th century, a whole new division of the army, was to a large extent driven by the armed forces' interest in their military potential. Great arms factories such as Schneider(in France) and Krupp(THyssenKrupp) in Germany mass produced even more powerful artillery pieces and ever more efficient rifles and machine guns. High explosive shells and smokeless propellants took over from solid shot and gunpowder. Naval Forces were transformed from wodden sailing ships with cannon to steam-driven ironclads with guns mounted in rotating turrets.

An observer may think that the period to the built up of the great war was quiet. He can't be more wrong. Although the wars were swift they would make the generals think that wars can be short and without lossess. The European wars of the 1848- 1871 period were in some ways deceptive. Prussia's swift victories over Austrria in 1866 and Franc ein 1871 appeared to show that moder armies could be effectgive instruments for fighting limited wars for limited political ends, in line  with contermporary thinking. But  the battle of solferino and the battles of the Crimean War showed the other side of the coin- how improved firearms and artillery were already making infantry and cavalry attacks on defensive postions increasingly costly and how the expanding scale of battles could make decisive manoevres hard to accomplish and effective command almost impossible to exercise. Rather the policies of Eurpoe's major powers after 1871 implied a belief in sheer numbers and the industrial might to back them up.

How came the slide to war then? Maintaining peace and limiting the destruction were subject much discussed in Europe, but nothing could stop the nations from going Gung-ho. The Franc-Prussian War of 1870-71 was the pivotal point the period. The creation of a dominant German state via the calculated use of miliatry power left France, until then the biggest Military power for over 400 years, desperate for revenge and desperately aware of weakness. Once France was allied with Russia, and Germany with Austria, the scene was set for a general conflict that many Europeans came to view as inevitable.

Complete list of Greek Military Leaders

This is a great list with all the ancient Greek Military readers. i found it on?

Ancient Greece

• Miltiades (550 BC–489 BC), athenian general during the Persian Wars
• Callimachus, athenian general during the Persian Wars
• Themistocles (525 BC–460 BC), athenian admiral during the Persian Wars
• Leonidas (d. 480 BC), Spartan king and general during the Persian Wars
• Eurybiades, spartan general during the Persian Wars
• Pausanias (Spartan general during the Persian Wars)
• Mardonius (Persian general during the Persian Wars)
• Cimon (Athenian general)
• Callias (Athenian general)
• Pericles (Athenian politician and general during the Peloponnesian War)
• Demosthenes (Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War)
• Cleon (Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War)
• Nicias (Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War)
• Thucydides (Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War)
• Brasidas (Spartan general during the Peloponnesian War)
• Alcibiades (Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War)
• Phormio (Athenian admiral during the Peloponnesian War)
• Thrasybulus (Athenian admiral during the Peloponnesian War)
• Lycophron (Spartan admiral during the Peloponnesain War)
• Xenophon – Elected Commander of the Ten Thousand
• Epaminondas (Theban general)
• Philip II of Macedon (Macedonian king and father of Alexander the Great)
• Alexander the Great (King of Macedon)
• Ptolemy I Soter, One of Alexander the Great's generals, founder of the Ptolemaic dynasty, he was the first king
• Demetrius I of Bactria, a Greek-born king who conquered much of what is now Iran, Pakistan and northern India. He was nicknamed "The Invincible"
• Memnon (Greek mercenary in Persian service)
• Pyrrhus of Epirus (King of Epirus who invaded Italy)

The Battle of Marathon, THe Battle that CHanged history.

The world is as it is. Imagine a "What if" scenario, where the Persians defeated and enslaved the Athenians and the rest of Greeks 2500 years ago. There would be no democracy in the world, Rome would never have existed and worst of all the Greek civilization( Theater, medicine, physics, arts, Parthenon) wouldn't have made it out of Greece. Marathon wasn't also significant on its own. It was a battle directed by Militades, a brilliant commander who was the first(according to the sources in our disposal) that used the Double envelopment method(a favorite strategy of Hannibal, Napoleon and other great leaders). When i were in The greek army i helped a major publish his essay. It is a long essay but for those of you who love military history and analysis it will prove valuable. I was considering wheteher or not to publish it but since i did my part for it(the political and cultural analysis of the battle) i deserver some credit.

by Major General Dimitris Gedeon, HEAR
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Note: The term "Greek" and "Greece" are generally used when quoting other sources. In my own text I use, when appropriate, the terms "Hellas" for Greece and "Hellenes" for Greeks.

The period of the Greek history Between 492 - 479 BC is known as «The Persian Wars». It was a period of contest between the city-states of Greece and the mighty Persian Empire. The cause of the Persian Wars was the expansion policy of the Persians. It was impossible for them to expand their empire eastwards (to India), or beyond Egypt (due to the Libyan Desert) or towards the inhospitable land of the Scythes (northwards), so their only choice was to advance westwards, to the European Continent. Greece was the primary barrier they had to breech in order to achieve their objective and Athens the most decisive opponent in Greece.

The Persians needed only a pretext and Athens obligingly provided this in 500 BC when the Greek cities of Ionia in Asia Minor, forming part of the Persian Empire, revolted against the Persian rule. Athens sent twenty ships to their assistance and the small city of Eretrtia in the island of Euboea five. The rebels had some initial success and burned Sardes, the capital of the Persian satrap of Ionia but they were soon defeated by the Persians. The Persian king, Darius, upon learning that some obscure city-states from mainland Greece had sent help to the rebels, asked to be informed "what short of thing was the city of 'Athens'"! When he was briefed about those insolent Athenians, became so angry that he fired an arrow skywards and vowed to punish them. His anger was such that every night at dinner, he had a servant repeat to him "Lord, don't forget the Athenians!"

In that way the Athenians gave the Great King the pretext he needed to invade Greece and clear the road to Europe. To invade Greece Darius had two routes: one by sea and one by land, each one with advantages and disadvantages. He chose the sea route but it proved disastrous. His first expedition in 492 BC failed because a storm, sent by the Gods from Olympus, destroyed his fleet. Two years later he launched his second attempt, again by sea but with a more southern route. This expedition resulted in the battle of Marathon.

After the failure of the expedition of 492 BC King Darius ordered new preparations and according to the customs of that time he sent heralds to the Greek cities and asked "earth and water" as a token of submission. Many cities complied but many did not, Athens and Sparta first and foremost among them. The Athenians considered the demand such a mortal insult that they threw the heralds, headfirst, from Acropolis and even condemned to death the unfortunate interpreter because by translating the Persian demand had reviled the Greek language. The Spartans promptly threw the heralds into the nearest well where they could find "earth and water" in great abundance! After that the war became inevitable. In the Spring of 490 BC the Persian army and fleet were ready. Their leaders were Datis, a Mede, and Artaphernes, a nephew of the King. Their mission was to oblige all the other Greeks who had refused to give "earth and water" to become vassals to the Great King, but also to shack Eretria and Athens and «bring before him all their inhabitants as slaves.»

The Persian fleet conveying a force of infantry and cavalry sailed across the Aegean Sea in late August or early September 490 BC. Most of the islands along their route submitted. The siege of Eretria lasted for six days until some of its citizens helped the Persians to enter the walls. The city was sacked and its inhabitants who survived the massacre that followed were taken prisoners. From Eretria the Persian fleet crossed to Marathon bay and landed there. The site of their landing was 35 klms northeast of Athens. The strength of the Persian army must have been around 48.000 men although their numbers vary according to the different historians who have described the battle. Why did they choose Marathon? There is a story behind this decision. The Athenians at that time had just expelled Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, their last tyrant. Hippias, who together with his remaining followers in Athens dreamed of coming again to power, was with the Persian Army as an adviser. It was he who said to Datis and Artafernis to land at Marathon. They could calculate, he argued, on drawing the Athenians away of Athens, facilitating thus the seizure of power there by his followers. It seemed also that Hippias had in his mind the battle between his father's , Pisistratus, army and the army of their political opponents in that same plain forty seven years earlier. Pisistratus had won the day and restored himself in the tyrannical power.

To quote Liddel Hart, if this was the intention of the landing at Marathon, then it succeeded, for the Athenians finally decided to rush to the Marathon plain to challenge the enemy. Bat Was that decision the right one? It seems that Hippias had not known well his compatriots. The Athenians would have gone there anyway. As soon as they were informed of the Persian landing they sent a runner to Sparta to ask for help and at the same time they considered the following three possible courses of action against the threat.

To fight the Persians at Marathon (the most daring of the three)
To wait the Persians at the Pallini pass (15 klms east of Athens)
To face the Persians walled in the City (the worst of the three)
The first solution prevailed due to the insistence of Miltiades, one of the ten Athenian generals. Miltiades persuaded the Athenians when he told them that their appearance in Marathon would have surprised greatly the Persians.
It seems that the lookout organization of the Athenians was very efficient and spotted immediately the landing of the enemy. One must have in mind that at that time the Athenian army could go to Marathon in 8 hours through the Pallini pass.

The Athenian runner arrived at Sparta 48 hours after he had been dispatched. The Spartans were willing to help but not to break their established law which prohibited them to leave Sparta before the moon had reached the full. So they waited for the full moon and then sent a force to help the Athenians. That force arrived after the battle of Marathon had been fought. But the Athenians had a most welcome surprise when they arrived at Marathon: a force of 1.000 Plataeans joined them there to fight with the Athenians against the common enemy. Athens would never forget that brave act of the Plataeans.

Here it is necessary to discuss the subject of the organization, command, doctrine and way of fighting of the Athenian and the Persian Armies.

The Persian Army consisted of infantry and excellent cavalry. Their doctrine was of defensive nature due to their main weapon which was the bow. The usual tactics was to wait the enemy to come close and then to "bury" him under a barrage of arrows. In 480 BC king Xerxes was dead serious when he said to King Leonidas in Thermopile that the Persian arrows would hide the sun (only to receive the Spartan reply "That is good, because we shall fight in the shade!!"). The weapons and armament of the Persian infantry made it unsuitable for close combat particularly with the heavily armed Greek Hoplites. Regarding their deployment, the Persians put in the middle of their battle formation their best troops, the Persians and the Sacae, while in the wings they deployed the soldiers provided by their vassals states. The cavalry was deployed in the flanks so that they could cover them and turn the enemy's as the case might be.

The Greek army's doctrine on the other hand was of offensive nature. Their main weapon, the long, heavy spear, their heavy armament (helmet, shield, breastplate, greaves) and their battle formation, the phalanx, favored close combat. The phalanx was deployed uniformly with a depth of eight spears. At that time the Athenian army had neither cavalry nor bows. The Athenians were divided into ten "tribes" (phylae). Each tribe had to mobilize 1.000 hoplites (soldiers) and to appoint a general as their leader. Thus the Athenian army comprised 10.000 hoplites and 10 generals. To that strength one must add a number of slaves and light infantry armed with small spears. When the army was assembled for war, each day one of the ten generals in turn was appointed as the head of the whole army for that day. Because they voted for any decision made, there was another general, appointed by the city, with the title of "polemarch" (literally "War ruler") who also had the right to vote. Thus there was no case of parity in the vote, the number of voters being eleven.

Regarding the spirit of the Athenians, who had a newly founded democratic state, I had better let Herodotus, the contemporary historian, the Father of History, to say the tale: "Liberty and Equality of civic rights are brave spirit stirring things, and they who, while under the yoke of a despot, had been no better men of war than any of their neighbors, as soon as they were free, became the foremost men of all. For each felt that in fighting for a free commonwealth, he fought for himself and whatever he took in hand he was willing to do the work thoroughly."

Miltiades, one of the ten generals, belonged to one of the noblest families of Athens. He was a wealthy man. About twenty eight years before Marathon Miltiades had gone to Thrace, as ruler of the Peninsula (to day Dardanels) and lived there up to 494 BC. When the Persian Empire expanded to that territory, Miltiades submitted to the Great King Darius and watch closely the Persian Army in its expedition against Scythia. Thus he had had a good idea of their tactics. During his staying in the Peninsula, Miltiades conquered and placed under the authority of Athens the islands of Lemnos and Imbros and therefore he stood high in public opinion. So when the invasion of the Persians became known he was elected as one of the ten generals of the Athenian army. The names of five generals are known. Among them were two generals who played a vital role in the last invasion of the Persians after ten years: Aristides and Themistocles. The name of the Polemarch is also known: Callimachus.

The plain of Marathon has the form of a crescent with a length of about ten klms and a maximum width of three in the center. It narrows towards its two ends where at that time existed marshes, flooded during the period the battle took place and therefore unsuitable for cavalry operations. The Persians had run their ships ashore and they had camped in even, unbroken ground. They were greatly surprised when the saw the Athenian army arriving at Marathon and encamping at the valley of Avlona (see map). The position was unattackable. The Persian camp was in full view in the distance. To the Athenians became clear that the enemy did not intend to make an overland advance to Athens since he had left unoccupied the two passes leading to Athens. So the fear of trickery became a decisive factor for the conduct of a battle. In the war council that was held, there was a parity of votes: five generals, with Miltiades first and foremost, were in favor of immediate attack while the other five voted for attack after the arrival of the Spartans. Then Miltiades turned to Callimachus the man whose vote would be decisive and said, in the words of Herodotus: "With you it rests Callimachus either to lead Athens to slavery or, by securing her freedom to leave behind to all future generations a memory far beyond even those who made Athens a democracy. For never since the time the Athenians became a people were they in so great a danger than now...." After that address Callimachus voted for immediate battle.

For eight days the two armies stood confronting each other. In the ninth day the Persians started embarking and it became apparent that a covering force would secure the Athenian army at Marathon while the rest of the army would sail to Athens to seize the defenseless city. The situation demanded immediate action and Miltiades, whose turn to be commander in chief had come that day, ordered the army of the 10.000 Athenians and the 1.000 Plataeans to deploy for battle.

Miltiades faced two difficult problems and to solve them applied new tactics, totally deviating from the commonplace tactics the Greeks had applied so far:

Taking into account the fact that the deployment of the Persian army was 30 men deep, (as described by Xenophon in his work Cyropaedia) the 48.000 thousand men would have formed a front-line of 1.600 meters. To equal that front-line, Miltiades had to array his army in a thin line. If the 10.000 Athenians formed a line 8 men deep their front would be only 1.250 meters wide, and thus the flanks would be dangerously exposed. But Miltiades knew from previous experience the way the Persians deployed their army: in the canter their best troops (Persians and Sacae) while in the flanks their vassals' forces (whose motivation usually was just "fight or else...." since no national cause inspired them). He also noticed that the Persian cavalry had already embarked, thus offering to him two advantages: first they posed no threat to his flanks and second they did not cover the Persian flanks. This led him to apply totally new tactics, which was to be repeated by Hannibal in the battle of Canea 3 centuries later and by the Germans in the battle of Tannenberg 24 centuries later. He deliberately weakened his own center forming a line of two Phylae in a depth of only four men (i.e. since each one of the Phylae had 1.000 men the front in the center was 500 meters wide). In each of the two flanks he deployed four more Phylae in the usual depth of 8 men, thus forming a front of 500 meters wide in each flank. (Thus the total front had a width of 500+500+500 = 1.500 meters). Finally to the left of the left flank of the Athenians he deployed the army of the Plateans with a depth of 8 men, and thus the front has a total width of 1625 meters. Callimachus took the honorary position in the right flank. The two Phylae of the center were led by two men who ten years later would become famous: the one was Aristides (the Just) who led the Athenian army in the battle of Plateae in 479 BC and the other Themistocles, the victor of Salamis in 480 BC.

The Persian army would try to exterminate the Athenian army with arrows. The range of the bows was about 150-200 meters. Therefore this critical distance before the heavily armed hoplites could engage the Persians in close combat had to be covered in the shortest possible time, and this could only be done at the double. To that end he applied the technic of the "assault at the double". As soon as the phalanx of his hoplites would be within the range of the Persian arrows, they would run so that they could cross the killing ground in the shortest possible time and fall on the enemy with the greatest possible momentum.
So in the morning of the 17th of September 490 BC, with perfect timing, Miltiades gave the order and the 11.000 Athenians and Plataeans formed their ranks and marched against the enemy, while the hills of Marathon must have resounded by the hymn that the great tragic poet Aeschylus, who fought in all the battles of the Persian Wars, brought to our days through his famous tragedy "Persians": "On, sons of the Hellenes! Fight for the freedom of your country! Fight for the freedom of your children and of your wives, for the gods of your fathers and for the sepulchers of your ancestors! All are now staked upon the strife!"

Herodotus tells us that "When the Persians saw the Athenians coming down on them without cavalry or archers and scanty in numbers, they thought them as an army of madmen running towards their certain destruction." Soon they arrayed their troops to face the "madmen". Nearing the "killing ground" the Athenians launched the assault at the double. The engagement developed exactly as planned. In the center the Phylae of Aristides and Themistocles fought bravely but the numbers of the Persians obliged them to cave in towards the inner country where the ground gave them the possibility to regroup and renew the fighting. In the flanks the Athenians and Plataeans had routed the opposing forces. Then Miltiades gave the order: they had to forget the fleeing enemy and turn against the backs of the Persians of the victorious, so far, center. And so they did. The Persians surrounded by their opponents, their short lances and swards and their wicker shields no match for the Hellenic spears, had no chance. Hard they fought but finally the previously invincible Persians turned their backs and fled while the Athenians followed them to the ships. There took place the hardest battle and there the Athenians suffered the heaviest casualties. There fell Cynaegyrus, the brother of Aeschylus, the noble and brave war ruler Callimachus and many other Athenians. By hard fighting the Persians succeeded to save all their ships except seven that were captured. The casualties of the Hellenes amounted to 192 Athenians and un unrecorded number of Plataeans and slaves, as it is implied by the fact that the Athenians to honor their dead buried them in three tombs (mounts). In one of the tombs were buried the Athenian citizens, in the second the Plataeans and in the third the slaves. The tomb of the Athenians still exists in the plain of Marathon and it is the starting point of the Marathon race. It is believed that the tomb of the Plataeans is found at the foot of Penteli mountain. The tomb of the slaves has not yet been discovered. Among the dead slaves was a little boy killed by a Persian arrow while giving water to the fighters during the battle. The Persians lost 6400 men but in these casualties we must include a large number of prisoners. For Herodotus tells us that when Miltiades perceived that the Persian fleet could sail and attack the undefended city of Athens, he left the Phylae of Aristides and Themistocles, who had been tried hardly in the center of the line, to keep the spoils and the prisoners. Then he with the rest of the army hastened to Athens. It is also known that when the battle was nearing its end, someone at the summit of Penteli mountain lift high a shield and sent an optical message. It is assumed that this was a signal to the Persians by one of the followers of Hippias, that the City was undefended, or, more possible, to the Athenians by some special observer who from Penteli could easily see the Persian fleet sailing towards the shores of Athens.

The Persian leaders had indeed sailed to Athens and arrived at the bay of Faliron. There another surprise awaited them: in the distant hills the saw the shields of the Athenians glistening in the sun. So they set about their fleet and left for Persia. That same evening the Spartans arrived. They asked permission to inspect the battlefield and when they were granted permission they expressed their admiration for the feat of the Athenians.
Thus ended the first great engagement between Greece and Persia but it did not end the contest. Ten years later a vast Persian Army, under king Xerxes himself, would invade Greece only to be defeated in Salamis and Plataea.
Was the battle of Marathon a "decisive" battle? Two distinguished historians, Fuller in his "Military History of the Western World" and Creasy in his "Fifteen Decisive Battles" have different opinions. According to Fuller "Marathon was a remarkable battle both from the point of view of Persian Strategy which was admirable, and of Grecian tactics, which were no less so. .... For the first time in their history the Greeks had beaten the Persians on their own element, the land, and Marathon endowed the victors with a faith in their destiny which was to endure for three centuries during which western culture was born. Marathon was the birth cry of Europe."
Greasy comes closer to the Greek opinion that the battle of Marathon was decisive for the world history. According to him: "The day of Marathon broke for ever the spell of the Persian invincibility which has paralyzed men's minds. It generated among the Greeks the spirit which beat back Xerxes and afterwards led on Xenophon, Agesilaus and Alexander in terrible retaliation through their Asiatic campaigns. It secured for mankind the intellectual treasure of Athens, the growth of free institutions, the liberal enlightenment of the western world and the gradual ascendancy for many ages of the great principles of European civilization."

What is the most important from the Greek point of view is epitomized in the Epigram that was written over the tomb of the Athenians: "The Athenians, as defenders of the Hellenes, in Marathon destroyed the might of the golden-dressed Medes". The Athenians were the first to realized that UNITY of all the Greek City-states was needed to counter the Persian threat.

What are the conclusions we can draw from the battle of Marathon, the battle in which courage won over numbers and close combat won over shooting arrows?

The most important conclusion is that the battle was a triumph of the morale forces over the numbers. The Athenian citizen at Marathon, knew what he was fighting for: he was defending his land, his family, his home. On the other hand the Asian and African troops, except the Persians, did not know what they were fighting for and many of them had merely to chose who would kill them: the Athenians or the Persians!

Regarding the principles of war we can see that Miltiades applied, for the first time in recorded history, and without having graduated any Military Academy, the following:

Offensive: He seized the initiative and ordered the attack against the Persians, with inferior numerically forces at the right moment.
Economy of force and mass: He deployed his line of battle in such a way as to hit the weakest section of the Persian line with his strongest. In other words he applied strong combat power at the decisive place and time. In that respect he did what few generals have done: he broke a «taboo», that is he changed the long applied tactics, risking an anathema against him in case of failure.
Unity of command. Herodotus tells us that the Athenian generals offered their turn of command to Miltiades, but he attacked the day of his turn of command. Thus he secured that all Phylae were under one responsible commander.
Surprise: First he persuaded the Athenians to go to Marathon and then at the decisive moment he attacked the enemy, applying the new tactics, in such a way that the Persians considered the Athenians «madmen».
Maneuver. In the battle of Marathon, Miltiades applied the maneuver of double envelopment. It does not matter that the front was not very extended. That was the way battles were fought those days. It matters that this magnificent maneuver, so often repeated by other great generals later, was conceived and directed successfully for the first time by Miltiades who had not had any previous knowledge or example.
Finally, I consider proper to offer the opinion on Miltiades by one distinguished historian, Hans Delbr(ck, who in his classic work «History of the Art of War, Warfare in Antiquity» writes:

«The figure of Miltiades as a field commander stands giant-like in the early annals of world military history. The most complete and rarest form of leadership that the art of work has evoked up to the present day, the defensive-offensive combination, is found here, in the simple lines of work of art of the first great military event. What perspicacity in his choice of the battlefield, what self-control in awaiting the enemy attack, what authority over the masses, over a proud, democratic citizens' levy, to be able to hold them fast in the chosen position and then to lead them forward to the attack at the double at the decisive moment! Everything was geared to this moment -not a minute too early, for the Athenians would have reached the enemy breathless and disordered; not a minute too late, for then too many of the enemy arrows would already have struck and the large number of falling and hesitating men would have slowed up and finally broken the power of the assault, which had to fall on the enemy line like an avalanche if it was to give victory. We shall have further occasion to discuss many a similar situation, but never a greater one.»

BIBLIOGRAPHY

GREEK WORKS

'Histories' Book 5, by Herodotus, Military Publication 1970

History of The Greek Nation, by K. Paparigopoulos, Athens 1930

Miltiades in the Battle of Marathon, by Maj. General M. Soulis, Military Review February 1972

Selected Battles, by HAGS, Army History Directorate, 1995

The Battle of Marathon, a Comparison with the Battle of Marne, by Arthour Boussier, Greek translation in the Military Review of March 1933

FOREIGN WORKS

A Military History of the Western World, by J. F. C. Fuller, Fank & Wagnalis 1954
Hellenic History, by G. W. Botsford and C. A. Robinson Jr., MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK 1956

History of the Art of War, Warfare in Antiquity, by Hans Delbr(ck, Bison Books 1990

Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, by sir E. S. Creasy, The Military Service Publishing, 1955

Think outside the Box. learn from Geniuses and create your own Legend

After reading DOMODOMO's blog i knew i had to write about Napoleon. Alexander and Napoleon left their own legends just by doing what others couldn't. Their strategic acumen was easily manifested. Two of my favorite stories about their way of thinking have to do with the Gordian Knot and the "Turk".

During the 18th century the royal courts of Europe were starved for exciting and fresh entertainment formats. The staid choral recital, piano concerto, plays and opera had been standard fare in all of the great palaces for centuries. Each court strove to offer something more modern, more cutting edge and contemporary.

In 1769 the Empress of Austria, Maria Therese invited a member of her entourage named Baron Wolfgang Von Kempelen to attend a conjuring show. Conjuring was a form of the emerging art of magic presentations. After the show was completed, Baron Von Kempelen announced loudly that the show was boring and he could do better.

The Empress took the Baron up on his declaration. She issued a challenge, which the Baron accepted, to return in six months with a completely new show. The Baron began to assemble the program that would, for 85 years, beguile and amaze audiences in Europe, America and South America.

The unveiling of “the Turk”, a mechanical chess playing robot, created an immediate sensation. A wooden man dressed in turban and Oriental garb was seated behind a square box with an ornate chessboard affixed to the top. Von Kempelen rotated the box, opening the doors on each side, revealing a complex series of gears, bearings and clock-like movements very intricately crafted. Turning a giant key, he would activate the mechanism and the Turk was ready to play. The Baron chose an ardent chess-playing member of the court as the Turk’s first opponent. The Turk played very fast, very decisively and easily vanquished his initial rival, much to the amazement of the court.

After the Empress died, her successor Emperor Joseph arranged for Baron Von Kempelen to tour Europe with the amazing Turk. The chess-playing robot was a sensation everywhere. He played all comers and almost never lost. He played Benjamin Franklin, considered a Grand Master player, in Paris and easily beat the great American.

The Turk’s most famous match was played in 1799 against Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon was at the height of his power and was considered the most brilliant military, governmental and political strategist of his age. He prepared for his match with the Turk as if preparing for the invasion of Egypt. He studied the robot’s strategies, pace of play and the aggressive tactics the machine had utilized in besting the best chess players in all of Europe where chess was played as a non-lethal substitute for warfare.

Napoleon settled on a disruptive strategy. He decided to attack the Turk’s lack of emotion, human instinct and reasoning. After all wasn’t he playing a machine? As the greatly anticipated match began, Napoleon began to negotiate alternative rules of play, slow the agreed pace of play (very fast, no withdrawal of moves, etc.) and make moves outside the parameters of the rules of chess. The Turk became furious (showing emotion), frustration (weakness) and swept away the chess pieces from the board (physical anger) all betraying emotions a machine could not possibly possess. This was an 18th century form of rope a dope.

The match with Napoleon exposed the Turk as a tiny human, an expert chess player, manipulating the movement arm of the wooden dummy to make chess moves through a series of hinges. The matches had to be played quickly owing to the severe confines of the box in which the tiny player was concealed.

Napoleon’s reputation for shrewd tactics, incisiveness and creativity was greatly embellished by quickly spreading the news of the results of the chess match with the Turk. His reputation for making unpredictable moves was reinforced and made his opponents even more wary of his potential for ruthless behavior. This was a man that was to be feared and his tactics would become more creative, cunning and novel. The capacity to innovate and create the aura of a leader to be feared and dreaded became Napoleon’s greatest asset as a warrior and Emperor of France.

Another great warrior from even more distant times was Alexander the Great. A warrior at the age of 14, general at 18, and king of tiny Macedonia at 20, Alexander conquered most of the known world before his untimely death at the age of 32. He is considered the greatest military tactician of all time.

Alexander lived during the fourth century before Christ, at a time when mysticism, myth and superstitions were an intricate part of daily life. The puzzle of the Gordian Knot was considered one of the world’s great mysteries. Outside of the Temple of Zeus, at the city of Gordus, there was an oxcart with an unusually complicated knot attached to the hitch. The world famous Gordian Knot was comprised of densely packed comer bark and there was no visible beginning or end to the maze of the knot. The priests and oracles of that day claimed that Zeus had promised that whoever could undo the knot would rule the world.

Princes, tyrants and dreamers came from all over the world to test their ability against the amazingly complex Gordian Knot. None had ever succeeded in loosening the tangled orb. Much as Napoleon approached the chess match with the Turk, Alexander planned strategy for his encounter with the Knot was as if entering his famous military campaign against King Darius and the Persians.

He spent several hours pondering the Gordian Knot. Alexander knew that success in loosening the Gordian Knot would trumpet his reputation as the world’s greatest king and military strategist. It would further motivate his army and sow fear in his enemies. Then, with a violent suddenness, Alexander grabbed a great axe and swung mightily. Hitting the immense Gordian knot directly in the center, it fell open like a pear. The gnarled bulk of the knot was severed and fell to the ground freeing the oxcart for the first time in centuries.

Alexander, like Napoleon many centuries later, saw a problem that had vexed men for many years. He took a creative, innovative and, in reality, the simplest approach to the task. The puzzle of the Gordian Knot did not come accompanied with a fixed set of rules that needed to be followed in order to claim success: just remove the knot from the oxcart. The simplicity of the task was shrouded in mystery, legend and the proximity of immense power and riches. Surely no such reward could be achieved so simply! Where was the beginning and end of the knot? Alexander understood that the conventional approaches to the problem, followed for centuries by all others attempting to untie the knot, was not relevant or of any import.

Alexander the Great said that his greatest victory was his success at solving the puzzle of the Gordian Knot. This achievement confirmed for the whole world that this man was a gifted, clever and an outside of the box thinker (a term certainly not utilized at the time of Alexander the Great). Successful entrepreneurs need to develop this same skill set as creative problem solvers, addressing insatiable market and consumer need for novel solutions and utility features to answer today’s problems and opportunities.