2 days ago I promised to explain and analyze the agency theory. Unfortunately I didnât have the time or the energy to delve into finer details. A promise is a promise and on top of that there is nothing better than transferring knowledge to friends and acquaintances. Agency theory is being criticized a lot by shareholders and managers. Why is that?
To examine and objectively discuss about a theoretical concept, like the agency theory, one has to start from the root. Remember the world is not Black & White, but contains a lot of Gray shades. For everyone who supports or acknowledges a theory, there is a counterpart who disagrees with the theoryâs principles. Having said that I will try to give both sides of the story in the following paragraphs.
The official definition is: Agency theory deals with the cooperative relationship which develops when one individual in an economic exchange (the principal) grants authority to another (the agent) to act on his or her behalf, and the welfare of the principal becomes affected by the decisions of the agent (Arrow, 1985; Barney & Ouchi, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Start the dissection now! Who is an agent? Who is the principal? Some real life examples will make these distinctions clear. Everyone is accustomed with the real estate agent, whom you contract (pay a commission) to either find you a place to buy/rent or to sell (depending on your needs). In this instant the Principal is the Buyer/Seller and the real estate agent, the agent.
Back to definitions again. The concern of this theory is that the welfare of the principal may not be maximized because the principal and the agent tend to have different goals as well as differing predispositions toward risk (Wright, Ferris, Sarin & Awasthi, 1996). I will examine whether this stands true for the real estate market. Do agents normally have different goals? Real life and experience says so. In this case experience stands to confirm a theoryâs underlying position.
A seller/buyer want to maximize his returns. A seller wants to find the best place for the lowest price. Let me rephrase a seller desires to find the apartment/house which maximizes the utility to him for the lowest price. On the other hand a buyer wants just to rent/sell to highest bidder. Where does the agent come in? An agent is like a middleman. He brings the two parties together. An agent gets awarded on a commission basis. His incentives are to close a deal ASAP. The agents try to seal on first come first serve basis. The best deals(high price or low price, depending on your view) take time to be found, one has to search. For the agent the extra effort is just not worth it. The incremental commission is always lower than a new commission on a fresh deal. The agent just needs to âpersuadeâ the parties that every deal is a âsweet dealâ.
You can apply this theory to other instances. A company hires an agent/scout to search for new products. Normally the company issues specific specks about quality and price and then awaits the quotes from the agent. The agent again has different incentives from the company. Finding products sooner is what he is trying to do. The information asymmetry plays to the agentsâ advantage. Information asymmetry deals with the study of decisions in transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. This creates an imbalance in power in transactions which can sometimes cause the transactions to go awry. The agent knows, or has the ability to know, the average price for some goods. The principals cannot. Therefore an agent most probably will try to find a supplier ASAP. The company has no way to discern whether the contract is good for them or not due to the lack of available information.
Need any more examples? Other instance can include: used car salesmen, sports agents (think of Jerry McGuire), wedding planners, travel agents, matchmakers (wouldnât you think of that I guess) and many others(Send me examples if you may).
Agency theory has been criticized for being too narrow because this theory emphasizes the contract between a principal and an agent, and the ways in which the contract can be made more efficient from the perspective of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989; Perrow, 1986). I will add another criticism. By browsing the web you can find various types of mathematics in relation to Agency costs and various utilities formulas. In my opinion mathematics just over complicate the theory and make it less approachable by non economics academics. Moreover I believe although mathematics may lead to better predictions, they are just not applicable in corporations and real life. They may be used to examine results afterwards not in advance. To keep this article simple, formulas wonât be used( for the truly obsessed Homo economicus read this paper http://www.econ.jhu.edu/people/Karni/seuwmhr.pdf).
Corporations are owned by shareholders. Shareholders(principals) have invested their money(equity) in the company. They hire/use managers(agents) to run the company. The concern of this theory is that the welfare of the principal may not be maximized because the principal and the agent tend to have different goals as well as differing predispositions toward risk (Wright, Ferris, Sarin & Awasthi, 1996). Specifically, principals are considered risk neutral in their preferences for individual firm actions since principals can diversify their shareholdings across multiple firms (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In contrast, agents are assumed to be risk averse since agent employment security and income are inextricably tied to a single firm (Donaldson, 1961; Williamson, 1963). In essence, agents are assumed to be risk averse in decisions regard ing the firm in order to lower risk to personal wealth. Thus, the focus of agency theory is on a contract that minimizes costs associated with an agency relationship (read full article at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-27250890_ITM).
Here is a look at how different parties have diverging interests. Management : Management, mostly the CEO, has their own objectives to accomplish. Empire-building, inflated earning( for higher bonuses), lavish expenses ( Corporate jets), cronyism, risk-averse strategies. Managementâs role is to maximize the shareholdersâ wealth. Sometimes though this is by far not true. Management either increases their own compensation or just scatters away shareholdersâ money.
Bondholders typically value a risk averse strategy since that will increase the chances of getting their investment back. Stockholders on the other hand are willing to take on very risky projects. If the risky projects succeed they will get all of the profits themselves, whereas if the projects fail the risk is shared with the bondholder.
Bondholders know this of course, so they will have costly and large ex-ante contracts in place prohibiting the management from taking on very risky projects should they arise, or they will simply raise the interest rate which in turn increases the cost of capital for the company.
The solution to the Agency theory was supposed to be: Incentives and Stock-options. Shareholders had to find a way to âalignâ incentives. Until the stock and options-scandals broke out they were considered to be the best ways out of this complex situation. The extreme focus on incentives can be counter-productive. Empirical evidence is plentiful just look at the corporate scandals of 2002. One school of thought supports that some managers should be able to invest in the company, without awarding them stock options. There are formulas that mix performance based bonuses with a normal salary. Critics accuse that these bonuses have 2 adverse consequences. Firstly they set a ceiling(or increase the need to cheat) and secondly do not take into consideration the long term benefit of the company. Like it has been noted management becomes more risk averse.
Basically one needs to know how to align incentives. The best medicine for know is pay for performance. Like everything else in this world, there is no panacea. No drug without side effects. This is the essence of brutal facts.